Tenth Circuit strikes a blow at PLRA fee caps
On April 4, 2005, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an award of attorney fees of close to $10,000 to an inmate who recovered $1.00 for a pre-incaceration deprivation of his fourth amendment right to be free of excessive force. In Robbins v. Larry Chronister, CV No. 02-3115, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, affirmed an award of attorney fees above the PLRA cap, which is 150% of the judgment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d). The Court held that the application of the PLRA cap would be absurd. The opinion is available at kscourts.org/ca10
Ralph Robbins was in jail for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. While in jail, he decided to sue the police officer he tried to run over with his car. He apparently sued the officer for pumping two bullets into his chest and one in his side. The court appointed an attorney for Mr. Robbins. While the magistrate judge found that Mr. Robbins had the three bullets coming to him, the judge took exception to the officer's decision to attempt to extract Mr. Robbins from his car by smashing his car window with a baton. It should be noted that the smash and attempted grab technique occurred before Mr. Robbins assaulted the officer with his car. The court found excessive force and awarded $1.00 to Mr. Robbins.
Having pressed lawyers into service, the magistrate judge balked at awarding the erstwhile lawyers $1.50 for their time. The magistrate awarded ten thousand dollars to the attorneys and, we hope, removed them from the pro bono panel for a year. The defendant appealed. The United States of America successfully intervened.
Judge Seymour wrote that the application of the PLRA fee cap to cases arising out of pre-incarceration deprivation of civil rights would be an absurd result. The PLRA, she wrote, was designed to curb frivolous litigation related to prison conditions. Judge Seymour marshalls a stirring defense of Section 1988. She writes quite powerfully:
the damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future. This deterrent effect is particularly evident in the area of individual police misconduct, where injunctive relief generally is unavailable. Congress expressly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil rights lawsuit does not do so for himself alone but is also a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest importance. . . . Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases . . . to depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief.
Right on Judge Seymour! Judge Hartz files a stingy dissenting opinion in which he expresses sympathy for "an attorney appointed by the court who is not compensated for the services rendered." Judge Hartz would have the attorney paid from "court funds", leaving us to wonder his planet of origin.